Rights in Soil and Mineral Under Water by Hallam, Oscar




Rights in Soil and Mineral Under Water
Oscar Hallam
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hallam, Oscar, "Rights in Soil and Mineral Under Water" (1917). Minnesota Law Review. 2039.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2039
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
RIGHTS IN SOILIAND MINERALS UNDER WATER.
This article deals with the ownership of the soil underlying
public bodies of water, and with rights in minerals there-
under. It is not the purpose of the article to discuss abstract
theories of right, but rather to review the decisions of the
courts, pertinent to the subject, which have already been made.
In many states there are no such decisions. Some states have
no minerals, some have no lakes or rivers, some that have
minerals and lakes and rivers have not their minerals in
proximity to bodies of water.
As on other subjects, the law on this subject starts with
the common law of England. The decisions there are not
numerous. England has minerals, but few lakes or large rivers.
Her minerals in some instances underlie the bed of the ocean,
but not the bed of lakes or streams. Scotland and Ireland have
lakes and some minerals, but not in many cases are minerals
found in the region of lakes or streams. In fact there is per-
haps no case which squarely determines the right of a riparian
owner to minerals underlying fresh water lakes or non-tidal
streams in the British Isles.
It is profitable before considering decisions bearing directly
on the subjedt of rights in minerals underlying lakes and
streams to first consider the more general question of title to
the soil which constitutes the bed of such waters.
In the early stages of the English common law, rights in
water beds were unimportant, and not often the- subject of
litigation. Early decisions and the early commentaries are
almost silent on the subject. But from what data we have
we may gather that in early times the King acted on the theory
that both the land and the water were his. He recognized no
public right in the sense that his subjects had any interest to
be subserved. No distinction was recognized between owner-
ship in private or proprietary capacity and ownership in a
sovereign or governmental capacity. The King conceived that
he could grant anything that he owned. He granted exclusive
fishery rights and he probably in some cases granted the water
beds. Land under water which any one cared to use passed
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into private use and probably private ownership. By and
by the rights of fishing and of navigation became so important,
and public sentiment in favor of the free exercise of those
rights became so strong, that it became a rule of law that no
exclusive rights could be granted in public waters. Public
waters were those which partook of the nature of the sea, that
is, water in which the tide ebbed and flowed. In time it be-
came recognized that the Crown held all public waters and the
water beds in a representative capacity for the benefit of all
its subjects-a prerogative that could not be abrogated. There
was no thought then that the Crown could not part with pri-
vate ownership in the soil under the public waters of the
kingdom. The idea was that into whatever hands the title
passed, the people had a public interest and a right to use for
certain public purposes, and this right a grant could in no
manner prejudice or take away.'
In the course of time the Crown surrendered its prerogative
right to Parliament, and grants of water rights came to be
made by that body or under its authority.2 But the law re-
mained otherwise the same. The law of England now is that
the title to the soil under all public or tidal waters, including
tidal rivers, is in the Crown ;3 that the title is held subject to the
public right of navigation and fishery; that it may be granted
but the grantee "can never do anything to interfere with the
navigation; and if a grant were made for the purpose of en-
abling the grantee to do that which would interfere with navi-
gation, that would be a void grant, because it would be a
grant which the Crown could not make, having regard to the
fact that it held the land for the benefit of the public, that is,
subject to the public right of navigation."4 As well stated in
People v. New York & S. L F. Co.,5 "The King by virtue of his
proprietary interest, could grant the soil, so that it should be-
come private property, but his grant was subject to the para-
1. 1 Farnham, Waters and Water Rights, § 36; Commonwealth v. Alger,
(1851) 7 Cush. (Mass.) 53, 65; Hale, De Jure Mars, Pt. 1, Chs. 4-6.
2. 1 Farnham, Waters & Water Rights, § 41.
3. The Royal Fishery of the Banne, (1674) Davis's Reps. 55, 56; Bul-
strode v. Hall, (1659) 1 Sid. 148; Lord Adv. v. Hamilton, (1852) 1 Macq.
(Scot.) 46; King v. Smith, (1780) 2 Doug. 441; Malcomson v. O'Dea,(1862-63) 10 H. L. Cas. 593; Moore Hist. & L. of Foreshore and Sea-
shore, 248.
4. Atty. Gen. v. Tomline, (1880) L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 58; 1 Farnham,
Waters & Water Rights, Sec. 36.
5. (1877) 68 N. Y. 71, 76.
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mount right of public use of navigable waters, which he could
neither destroy nor abridge."6
As to inland lakes and rivers above the ebb and flow of the
tide, it is settled by the common law of England that the
underlying soil belongs to the riparian proprietor.7 Yet if the
stream is navigable this ownership is subject to the public
right of navigation. In Blount v. Layard,8 Bowen, J., in speak-
ing of the River Thames, says: "We are dealing with the
Thames, which is not a tidal river at the place in question.
But, on the other hand, it is a navigable river, that is, all the
Queen's subjects have the right of passing and repassing on
it, and it is what is called in the old books a 'King stream,' by
which is meant, not that the soil must belong to the King, but
that it is a highway, and that the King is the natural guardian
and conservator of the commodious and convenient passage of
the river by his subjects."
In the United States we start with a somewhat anomalous
situation. When the thirteen original states established their
independence, each state became the owner of the unappro-
priated land within its borders, and continued to own it, sub-
ject only to surrender since made to the Federal government.
The right of the United States to public lands originated in
voluntary surrender made by several of the states of their
waste and unappropriated lands to the United States under a
resolution of the Congress of the Federation of September 6,
1780, recommending such surrender and cession to aid in pay-
ing the public debt incurred by the Revolution, the object
being to convert the land into money for the payment of the
debt. Where foreign governments ceded territory to the
United States, the unappropriated land therein passed to the
United States, and new states formed therefrom never had
title thereto. It was early held that when cession was made by
the states to the United States, the navigable waters and the
soil under them were not ceded to the United States, nor
were they granted to the United States by the adoption of the
United States constitution, but they were reserved to the states
respectively. And it was also early held that new states formed
6. See also Hardin v. Jordan, (1890) 140 U. S. 371, 11 S. C. R. 808.
7. Hale, De Jure Mars, Pt. 1, Ch. 1 ; Hindson v. Ashby, (1896) L. R. 1
Ch. Div. 78; Orr Ewing v. Colquhoun, (1877) L. R. 2 App. Cas. 839;
Scott v. Napier, (1869) 7 Ct. of Sess. Cas. 35; Bristow v. Cormican,
(1878) L. R. 3 App. Cas. 641.
8. (1891) 2 Ch. 681 (note), 65 L. T. 175.
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after the constitution was adopted, have the same right in the
soil underlying public waters within their borders as the orig-
inal states."
At the outset, then, the people of each state held the ab-
solute right to all their navigable waters and the soil under
them;1O and when the United States government issues its
patent to public land bordering upon public water, the land
under the water does not pass to the riparian proprietor by
force of the grant, because the United States does not own it;
but if the riparian proprietor acquires the underlying soil at
all it is by the gratuitous favor of the state which does own it,
but which is no party to the patent or grant."' Accordingly
the question of the respective rights of the public and of the
riparian proprietor in the soil under public water within a
state is a question, not of Federal but of state cognizance.1
2
It was said in the case just cited that it is for the several
states themselves to determine this question, and, "If they
choose to resign to the riparian proprietor rights which prop-
erly belong to them in their sovereign capacity, it is not for
others to raise objections." Very few states have determined
this question by legislative action. In most cases the courts
have been obliged to determine the respective rights of the
state and of the riparian owner without legislative guidance.
In this country, as in England, waters are classified as
navigable and non-navigable, but the ebb and flow of the tide
has not always been accepted as the test of navigability in the
United States. There are many great navigable rivers into
which the tide never flows. At an early day Chief Justice
Taney, speaking of this matter, said, "If a distinction is made
on that account, it is merely arbitrary, without any founda-
tion in reason, and, indeed, would seem to be inconsistent
with it; '13 yet this test has been in a good many cases
adopted.'" In some states the distinction has been repudiated
9. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, (1845) 3 How. 212; Mumford v. Wardell,
(1867) 6 Wall, 423, 436; St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. Water
Comm'rs, (1897) 168 U. S. 349, 658-9, 18 S. C. R. 157.
10. Mumford v. Wardell, supra.
11. Barney v. Koekuk, (1876) 94 U. S. (4 Otto) 324; Hardin v. Shedd,(1902) 190 U. S. 508, 519, 23 S. C. R. 685.
12. Barney v. Keokuk, supra.
13. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, (1850) 12 How. 443, 454.
14. Cobb v. Davenport, (1867) 32 N. J. L. 369; Fulton L. H. & P. Co. v.
State of New York, (1910) 200 N. Y. 400. See Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v.
Illinois, (1892) 146 U. S. 387, 435, 13 S. C. R. 110.
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and it is held that "waters which are navigable in fact are
navigable in law."'15 There is no uniform test to determine
what waters are navigable in fact.
In Hodges v. Williams,"6 it was held that the test of navig-
ability is whether or not the water is navigable for sea-going
vessels. Elsewhere it is held that in order to be classed as a
navigable river the stream must be capable of practical gen-
eral uses and must afford a channel for useful commerce.17 In
other states the term navigability has been broadly used to
include waters not navigable in the ordinary sense of that
term, and to embrace all waters public in their nature. Under
this rule, though a body of water is not adapted to use for
commercial navigation, still if it is suitable for such public
purposes as boating for pleasure, fishing, fowling, bathing,
skating, it is held to be public or navigable water.'"
As to the title to water beds, there is much lack of uniform-
ity of rule. Generally it is held that title to the beds of all
non-navigable ponds and streams is in the riparian propri-
etor ;19 though on this point decision is not unanimous.' 0
When it comes to the soil underlying public or navigable
fresh waters, the confusion is great. As to the Great Lakes
and other large lakes, like Lake Champlain, it is agreed that
the title to the underlying soil is in the state.21 Between great
lakes and mere ponds there is a point in diminishing size below
which title may be conceded to be in the individual. There is
another point above which all agree that the title must be in
the state. Between the two are the many bodies of water
which are the subject of controversy.
Some courts hold that the riparian owners own the soil
under navigable fresh waters. 22  The theory of these cases
15. Schulte v. Warren, (1908) 218 Il. 108, 118, 75 N. E. 783; 13 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 745.
16. (1886) 95 N. C. 331.
17. Schulte v. Warren, supra.
18. Lamprey v. State, (1893) 52 Minn. 181, 199, 200, 53 N. W. 1139, 38
Am. St. R. 541, 18 L. R. A. 670; Grand, Rapids v. Powers, (1891) 89 Mich.
94, 50 N. W. 661, 14 L. R. A. 498.
19. Rhodes v. Cissel, (1907) 82 Ark. 367, 101 S. W. 758; Foss v. John-
stone, (1910) 158 Cal. 119, 110 Pac. 294.
20. See Noyes v. Collins, (1894) 92 Ia. 566, 61 N. W. 250, 26 L. R. A. 609.
21. 1 Farnham, Waters & Water Rights, § 58; Ill. Cent. Ry. Co. v.
Illinois, supra; People v. Silberwood, (1895) 110 Mich. 103, 67"N. W. 1087,
32 L. R. A. 694.
22. Donovan-Hopka-Ninneman Co. v. Hope Lbr. Mfg. Co., (1912) 194
Fed. (Idaho) 643; Johnson v. Johnson, (1910) 14 Ida. 561, 95 Pac. 499,
24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1240; Berry v. Snider, (1867) 66 Ky. 266; Grand
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generally is that the rule of the English common law as to
ownership of soil under fresh water lakes and streams should
be applied in the United States.
Some decisions, repudiating the common law rule as inap-
plicable in the United States, hold that the soil underlying
navigable fresh water belongs to the state in a proprietary
capacity.23
Some courts hold that the title to the soil underlying all
public or navigable waters belongs to the state in its sovereign
capacity in trust for the people. 24
Some hold that the soil underlying navigable rivers belong
to the state ;25 while that underlying navigable lakes belongs
to the riparian owner.28
Some hold that soil underlying navigable lakes belongs to
the state, and the beds of navigable rivers to the riparian
owner.
2 7
Some decisions hold that the soil under water susceptible
of public use is owned by the riparian proprietor, but that such
ownership is subject to the public use.28
It is a rule generally recognized that mineral under the
earth belongs to the owner of the surface. In the case of non-
navigable bodies of water, it is generally conceded that, since
the bed of the water belongs to the riparian proprietors, min-
erals underlying the water bed belong to them also. In the
jurisdictions where the riparian owner upon a public lake or
Rapids Ice & Coal Co. v. South Grand Rapids Ice & Coal Co., (1894)
102 Mich. 227, 60 N. W. 681, 25 L. R. A. 815; Steamboat Magnolia v.
Marshall, (1860) 39 Miss. 109; Fulton L. H. & P. Co. v. State of N. Y.,
supra.
23. Chapman v. Kimball, (1831) 9 Conn. 38; Hammond v. Shepard,
(1900) 186 Ill. 235, 57 N. E. 867, 78 Am. St. Rep. 274; Carr v. Moore,(1903) 119 Ia. 152, 93 N. W. 52, 97 Am. St. Rep. 292; Pacific Elevator Co.
v. Portland, (1913) 65 Ore. 349, 133 Pac. 72; Conneaut Lake Ice Co. v.Quegley, (1909) 225 Pa. 605, 74 Atl. 648; Reelfoot Lake Case, (1913) 127
Tenn. 575, 580, 158 S. W. 746; New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co.,
(1901) 24 Wash. 493, 501 (by constitution) 64 Pac. 735, 54 L. R. A. 190.
24. Lamprey v. State, supra; Florida v. Black River Phosphate Co.,
(1893) 32 Fla. 82, 13 So. 640; Wilton v. Van Hessen, (1911) 249 Ill. 182,
94 N. E. 134; Roberts v. Baumgarten, (1888) 110 N. Y. 380, 18 N. E. 96;
Flisrand v. Madson, (1915) 35 S. D. 457.
25. Paul v. Hazleton, (1874) 37 N. J. L. 106 (tidal).
26. Cobb v. Davenport, (1867) 32 N. J. L. 369.
27. Fuller v. Shedd, (1896) 161 Ill. 462, 483, 44 N. E. 286; Bradley v.
Rice, (1836) 13 Me. 198, 201; State v. Gilmanton, (1838) 9 N. H. 461;
Kanouse v. Slockblower, (1891) 48 N. J. Eq., 42, 21 Atl. 197; Fletcher v.
Phelps, (1856) 28 Vt. 257; Willow River Club v. Wade, (1899) 100
Wis. 86, 97, 76 N. W. 273, 42 L. R. A. 305.
28. Fulton L. H. & P. Co., v. N. Y., supra; Willow River Club v. Wade,
supra.
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stream takes to the center thereof, it will doubtless be con-
ceded that he owns any minerals that underlie the soil. In the
jurisdictions where the state is held to own the bed of public
waters in a proprietary capacity, there will probably be little
doubt that the state owns any minerals that may be found
under the bed of the water. In the jurisdictions where the
state is held to be the owner of the water bed in its sovereign
capacity, little more can be done than to give the substance of
the few decisions that we have.
Something depends on what is meant by holding title in a
sovereign capacity. The authorities are not in harmony as to
what this term signifies. In England, as above stated, the soil
underlying tidal rivers is held by the Crown in a sovereign
capacity in the sense that it holds, not as a beneficiary, but
as a trustee, subject to the paramount right of public use.
But this ownership in a sovereign capacity is not there
thought to be inconsistent with a holding of title in a proprie-
tary capacity, in the sense that the property may be sold and
become the private property of another, impressed with the
same trust for public use.29 Some American decisions take
the same view.
In Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Illinois,3° Justice Field said:
"The State holds the title to the lands under the navigable
waters * * * in trust for the people of the State, that they
may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce
over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the
obstruction or interference of private parties. * * * The
control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never
be lost except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the
interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without
any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands
and waters remaining," but that these lands "belong to the
respective States within which they are found, with the
consequent right to use or dispose of any portion thereof
where that can be done without substantial impairment of the
interest of the public in the waters".
In People v. Kirk,31 it was held that the state could by
statute give the right to construct a drive along Lake Michigan
and fill in the bed of the lake for that purpose, so long as it
29. See People v. N. Y. & S. I. F. Co., (1877) 68 N. Y. 71.
30. (1892) 146 U. S. 387, 13 S. C. R. 110.
31. (1896) 162 Il1. 138, 45 N. E. 830, 53 Am. St. Rep. 277.
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does not substantially interfere with the right of navigation
and fishing, and that such action was not a violation of the
trust by which the state held the lake bed. It was said
that if necessary for the best interests of the people, a portion
of the bed of the lake not useful for fishery or navigation
might be reclaimed and devoted to park purposes. 32
In State ex rel., Ellis v. Gerbing,33 it was said that "the
title to lands under navigable waters * * * is held by the
State * * * for navigation and other useful purposes af-
forded by the waters over such lands," * * * that, "the
trust with which these lands are held by the State is govern-
mental, and cannot be wholly alienated," that, "submerged
lands, * * * may be disposed of by legislative authority,
if such disposition does not impair the rights of the whole
people to the use thereof for any purpose expressed or implied
by law," that the use of the land under navigable waters may
be granted for the purpose of aiding navigation or commerce,
or encouraging new industries, and the development of natural
or artificial resources, in the interest of all the people, and that
"the State may grant reasonable and limited privileges for
planting and propagating oysters or shell fish on land covered
by waters of navigable streams; but such privileges should
not unreasonably impair the rights of the whole people of
the State in the use of the waters or the lands thereunder for
the purposes implied by law."
In Mowry v. City of Providence,34 the court said: "In
the case of Clark v. The City of Providence,35  * * *
this court held * * * that the State or the General
Assembly as the organ of the State, is the representative of
the public or people as to the public right, and as such has
the power to release the right, the General Assembly having
in the matter the authority, not simply of the English crown,
but of both crown and parliament, except so far as it has been
limited by the Constitution of the State or the Constitution
and Laws of the United States."
In Pac. Elev. Co. v. Portland,386 it was held that a state may
32. See also Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Chicago, (1898) 173 Ill. 471, 50 N. E.
1104; same case, (1900) 176 U. S. 646, 20 S. C. R. 509; Bliss v. Ward,(1902) 198 Ill. 104, 64 N. E. 705.
33. (1908) 56 Fla. 603, 47 So. 353. 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 337.
34. (1890) 16 R. I. 422, 16 At. 511.
35. (1890) 16 R. I. 337, 15 Ati. 763.
36. (1913) 65 Ore. 349.
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grant title to tide lands held by it in its sovereign capacity into
private ownership,,subject to the paramount public right of
navigation and such reasonable regulations as the state may
prescribe. It was said that lands totally or partially sub-
merged are made the subject of grant by the sovereign, in
order that they may be reclaimed for useful purposes.37  The
court further said, citing Hinnan v. Warren,38 "As the State
became the owner of the tide lands, it had the power * * *
to sell the same. It has, however, no authority to dispose of
its tide lands in such a manner as may interfere with the free
and untrammeled navigation of its rivers, bays, inlets, and
the like. The grantees of the state took the land subject to
every easement growing out of the right of navigation in-
herent in the public."
In Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co.,3 9 where the same
view as to the nature of the state's title prevails, it was held
that the state might grant the soil under the bed of the bay of
San Francisco for the purpose of reclamation, where it was
capable of reclamation without detriment to any public right.
In Saunders v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 0 it was said that,
"while the State holds the title to lands under navigable
waters in a certain sense as trustee for the public, it is
competent for the supreme legislative power to authorize and
regulate grants of the same for public or such other purposes
as it might determine to be for the best interests of the state."
One commentator has said: "The trust theory cannot, on
principle, be carried to such an extent as to prevent the state
from granting the title of the soil under its waters to private
individuals and permitting such use of it as is possible, con-
sistent with the public rights".
41
In Wisconsin, where the doctrine of ownership by the
state in its sovereign capacity prevails, the right to grant the
37. Citing Taylor Sands Fishing Co. v. State Land Board, (1910) 56 Ore.
157, 161, 108 Pac. 126; Fowler v. Wood, (1906) 73 Kan. 511, 549.
38. (1877) 6 Ore. 408.
39. (1897) 118 Cal. 160, 50 Pac. 277.
40. (1895) 144 N. Y. 75, 38 N. E. 992, 26 L. R. A. 378. See also People
v. Steeplechase Park Co., (1916) 113 N. E. (N. Y. Ct. of App.) 521.
41. 1 Farnham, Waters and Water Rights, § 36a, citing Weber v. Harbor
Comm'rs, (1873) 18 Wall. (85 U. S.) 57; Barney v. Keokuk, (1876) 94
U. S. 324; Hoboken v. Penn. R. R. Co., (1887) 124 U. S. 656, 688, 690, 691,
8 S. C. R. 643; Shively v. Bowlby, (1893) 152 U. S. 1, 25, 14 S. C. R. 548;
Gough v. Bell, (1847) 21 N. J. L. 156, 165; same case, (1850) 22 N. J.
L. 441. Further, as to grants by the state, see Martin v. Waddell, (1842)
16 Pet. 367; Pollard, Lessee v. Hagan, (1845) 3 How. 212; Jones v.
Oemler, (1899) 110 Ga. 202, 35 S. E. 575; Hatfield v. Grimstead, (1846)
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bed of public waters is much circumscribed. In McLennan
v. Prentice,4 2 the cour.t said: "The state has no proprietary
interest in them, and cannot abdicate its trust in relation to
them, and, while it may make a grant of them for public
purposes, it may not make an irrepealable one, and any at-
tempted grant of the land would be held, if not absolutely
void on ifs face, as subject to revocation." In another case,
however, it was said: "Submerged lands of * * * lakes
within the boundaries of this state belong to the state-in trust
for public use, substantially the same as submerged lands
under navigable waters by the rules of the common law.
'43
In Minnesota, where it is held that the title is in the state
in its sovereign, capacity; the doctrine that the state has any
title which it may convey is repudiated. In Bradshaw v.
Duluth Imperial Mill Co.,4 it is said: "The old common law
doctrine * * * that the crown has a jus privatum, or
right of private property, in navigable waters and their shores,
which it could alienate to a subject, has no place in the
jurisprudence of this state. It is the settled law with us
that the rights of the state in navigable waters and their beds
are sovereign, and not proprietary, and are held in trust for
the public as a highway, and are incapable of alienation." 45
In other cases in Minnesota it has been held, in substance,
that, while the riparian owner does not own the bed of
navigable waters, yet he may wharf off beyond low water
mark and occupy the bed of the water subject only to the
regulations of the state ;46 that his private right of use is not
limited to purposes connected with navigation, but may ex-
tend to any purpose not inconsistent with the public right ;47
that he has the exclusive right, absolute, as respects every
29 N. C. 139; Shepard's Point Land Co. v. Atlantic Hotel, (1903) 132
N. C. 517, 44 S. E. 39, 61 L. R. A. 937; Eisenbach v. Hatfield, (1891) 2
Wash. 236, 26 Pac. 539, 12 L. R. A. 632; New Whatcom v. Fairhaven
Land Co., (1901) 24 Wash. 493, 64 Pac. 735, 54 L. R. A. 190.
42. (1893) 85 Wis. 427, 444-5, 55 N. W. 764.
43. Village of Pewaukee v. Savoy, (1899) 103 Wis. 271, 79 N. W. 436, 50
L. R. A. 86.
44. (1892) 52 Minn. 59, 65, 53 N. W. 1066.
45. See, also, Lamprey v. State, (1892) 52 Minn. 181, 53 N. W. 1139, 38
Am. St. R. 541, 18 L. R. A. 670. This is followed in Flisrand v. Madson,
35 S. D. 457. 470. See, also, State v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., (1916 Ohio)
113 N. E. 677.
46. Brisbine v. St. P. &. S. C. R. Co., (1876) 23 Minn. 114, 130.
47. Hanford v. St. P. & D. R. Co., (1889) 43 Minn. 104, 111, 42 N. W.
596, 44 N. W. 1114, 7 L. R. A. 722.
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one but the state, and limited, only by the public interests of
the state, for purposes connected with public uses-to im-
prove, reclaim and occupy the surface of the submerged land,
out to the point of navigability, for any private purpose, as he
might do if it were his separate estate,4s and that the rights
which thus belong to him as riparian owner are valuable
property rights of which he cannot be divested without con-
sent, except by due process of law, and, if for public purposes,
upon compensation.4 9
The cases which directly pass upon the rights of parties
to mineral under public waters are few.
In the year 1858 the question arose in England as to the
rights of the Queen and the Prince of Wales, as Duke of
Cornwall, to the mines and minerals under the shore and sea
adjoining the coasts of Cornwall. "The decision of the arbi-
trator was that all the mines and minerals lying under the
seashore between high and low water marks, and under the
estuaries, tidal rivers and other places beyond low water
mark, which were within the county, belonged to the Prince
as part of the soil and territorial possessions of the Duchy of
Cornwall; but that the right to all mines and minerals beyond
low water mark, under the tide waters adjacent to, but not
part of, the county was vested in the Queen.!59
In Lord Advocate v. We1nyss,5 by way of dictum, Lord
Watson said: "Whether the Crown could make an effectual
grant of that solum or of any part of it to a subject appears to
me to be a question not unattended with doubt; but I do not
think that the Crown could, without the sanction of the legisla-
ture, lawfully convey any right or interest in it which, if exer-
cised by the grantee, might by possibility disturb the solum or
in any way interfere with the uses of navigation, or with any
right in the public. The mineral strata below the bed of the
sea, in so far as they are capable of being worked without
causing disturbance, appear to me to stand in a different posi-
tion. To that extent, I know of no principle of Scottish law
which could prevent the crown from communicating the right
of working to a subject, in the character either of tenant or
proprietor. If that be so, it would follow that submarine
48. Id. 118.
49. Brisbine v. St. P. & S. C. R. Co., supra.
50. Gould, Waters (3rd ed.) § 10.
51. (1900) A. C. 48, 66.
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materials, if expressly included, might, to the extent which I
have indicated, be competently made parts and pertinents of a
baronial or other Crown grant of adjacent lands."
In Steele v. Sanchez,52 it was held that the Des Moines
River at Ottumwa was formerly a navigable stream, and that
the proprietary title to the bed of the river was in the public,
that the title of the riparian owner extended only to high
water mark, that he has certain rights below that point, but
they are not the subject of transfer independent of the land to
which they are appurtenant, and that the riparian owner has
no such right in stone under the river bed as to authorize him
to sell the same, and that he could not recover for stone
quarried therefrom, the right to take which he undertook to
sell.
In Brandt v. McKeever,53 the court recognized the right of
the state to grant the right to the minerals underlying the bed
of the Monongahela River.
In Taylor v. Commonwealth, 4 it was held that the navig-
able waters below low water mark and the soil under them,
within the territorial limits of the state, are the property of the
state, to be controlled by the state in its discretion, for the
benefit of the people of the state, and that an act of the Vir-
ginia legislature which so declared was but a declaration sanc-
tioned and supported by the common law. It was said, that the
right of the riparian owner is the right of access and of wharf-
age, the right to accretions, and the right to make reasonable
use of the water; that these rights of the commonwealth and
of the riparian owner must be exercised, if possible, so that
the one shall not unreasonably disturb or impair the enjoy-
ment of the other, but that a riparian owner of land upon the
navigable portion of York River, who is not disturbed in the
enjoyment of the stream, cannot complain of the fact that the
state leases to a citizen a portion of the bed of a navigable
stream for the purpose of sinking an artesian well, and using
the water therefrom; that the commonwealth holds the soil
underneath such navigable waters as trustee for the benefit
of all her citizens, and whatever the soil contains belongs to
the state, and it alone has the right to develop these hidden
sources of wealth for the common benefit of all of its citizens;
52. (1887) 72 Ia. 65.
53. (1851) 18 Pa. 70.
54. (1904) 102 Va. 759, 47 S. E. 875, 102 Am. St. Rep. 865.
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that it is not only her right, but her duty as such trustee, to
render this property productive.
In Florida v. Black River Phosphate Co.,55 where the doc-
trine of ownership by the state in its sovereign capacity pre-
vails, it was held that the riparian owner had no right to take
phosphate from the bed of a navigable river under any cir-
cumstances, except by consent of the state duly given by the
law-making power, and upon such terms and conditions as it
may prescribe.
In State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Southern Sand & Material
Co., 5 8 it was held that the state held the title to the beds of its
navigable streams as a trustee for its citizens, and that the
sale of sand and gravel therefrom was but a method of utilizing
the common property of the state for the benefit of its citizens,
and it was further held that the state might recover for sand
taken from the bed of the Arkansas River for commercial pur-
poses a price or royalty'fixed by statute.
In State v. Akers,5 7 a similar case, it was held that the
state owns the sand under the Arkansas and Kansas Rivers,
in trust for all the people; that any citizen may take what he
needs for his own use, but the state may impose a royalty
upon those taking it for commercial purposes.
In State v. Pacific Guano Co.,5" it was held that the state,
and not the riparian owners, owned phosphate rock underlying
certain navigable streams of the state, and that the state
might enjoin the removal thereof by the riparian owners, and
might recover the value of that already taken by them.
In Bradley v. S. C. & P. River Min. Co.,5 9 the United States
Circuit Court recognized as valid a statute igranting to certain
named persons the right to dig and mine in the beds of the
navigable waters of the state of South Carolina for phosphate
rocks and phosphate deposits.
State v. Korrer,60 involves some of the rights of the state
and of riparian owners in the matter of thg mining of iron ore
which lies beneath the bed of Longyear Lake, a public body of
water. The court held that the title to the soil under the
55. (1893) 32 Fla. 82, 114, 13 So. 640, 21 L. R. A. 189.
56. (1914) 113 Ark. 149, 167 S. W. 854.
57. (1914) 92 Kan. 169, 140 Pac. 637.
58. (1884) 22 S. C. 50.
59. (1877) 1 Hughes (U. S. C. C.) 72, Fed. Cas. No. 1787. See also
Coosaw Mining Co. v. South Carolina, (1891) 144 U. S. 550.
60. (1914) 127 Minn. 60, 148 N. W. 617, L. R. A. 1916 C., 139.
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waters below low water mark is held by the state, but in its
sovereign governmental capacity; that the state has the right
to conserve the integrity of its public lakes and rivers, and
that the riparian owner has no right, against the protest of the
state, to destroy the bed of a public lake for the private pur-
pose of taking ore therefrom, and that the fact that the por-
tions of the lake in controversy are, during low water, not
capable of any substantial beneficial use, does not prevent the
state from objecting to its diversion to a private use foreign
to the public uses of the water and the soil under it. The
right of the state to itself take ore from the lake bed, the
power of the state to give to the riparian owner or anyone
else the right to do so, the right of the riparian owner to take
ore from the lake bed if it could be done without disturbing
the waters or the public use thereof, and the ownership of the
ore in fact taken out, were questions the court did not decide.
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